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ABSTRACT
In recent years, the Internet of Things (IOT) has drawn con-
siderable attention from the industrial and research commu-
nities. Due to the vast amount of data generated through
IOT devices and users, there is an urgent need for an ef-
fective search engine to help us make sense of this massive
amount of data. With this motivation, we begin our ini-
tial works on developing a secure and eﬃcient search en-
gine (SecDS) based on EPC Discovery Services (EPCDS)
for EPCglobal network, an integral part of IOT. SecDS is
designed to provide a bridge between diﬀerent partners of
supply chains to share information while enabling them to
ﬁnd who is in possession of an item. The most importan-
t property of SecDS is: while eﬃciently processing user’s
search, it is also secure. In order to prevent unauthorized
access to SecDS, an extended attribute-based access control
model is proposed and implemented such that information
belonging to diﬀerent companies can be protected using d-
iﬀerent policies.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
D.4.6 [Security and Protection]: Access controls; H.4
[Information Systems Applications]: Miscellaneous
General Terms
Design, Security
Keywords
EPC Discovery Service, Access Control, EPCglobal Net-
work, Internet of Things
1. INTRODUCTION
As an integral part of future Internet, Internet of Things
(IOT) has drawn considerable attention from the industrial
and research communities around the world. Through IOT,
we can look forward to a world where physical objects and
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virtual data interact [12], generating mass amount of data
that will exceed that of what we have on the world-wide-
web (WWW) today. There is an urgent need for a relevant
search engine, to help us make sense of this data, just as
how BING and Google are helping us navigate through the
trillion-page Internet today.
EPCglobal network [7] is an important part of IOT. As a
global standard RFID data sharing infrastructure, EPCglob-
al network is made up of Electronic Product Code (EPC)
[10], EPC Information Services (EPCIS) [11], EPC Discov-
ery Service (EPCDS) [9], amongst others.
In EPCglobal network, each physical product is associated
with an RFID tag, represented by a unique EPC. This EPC
can be retrieved from the RFID tags wirelessly via RFID
readers as it transits between locations without contact-of-
sight. These read events are usually processed by a middle-
ware [8], and are stored locally at each supply chain part-
ner’s location-centric EPCIS [24]. With dynamic churn rates
of partners and EPCIS, EPCDS becomes a unifying ﬁgure,
helping partners locate information about a product in the
supply chain. Through EPCglobal Network, participants
can avoid information blackouts, and reaping the beneﬁts of
the RFID promise.
As the search and discovery component of EPCglobal net-
work, EPCDS is designed with the intention of providing
a bridge between supply chain partners, allowing them to
share information, getting a step closer to achieving an au-
tomated supply chain. Due to the sensitivity and high value
of the data transacted in EPCDS, a suitable access control
mechanism is required. In this paper, we attempt to design
and implement a secure and eﬃcient EPCDS (SecDS) with
an eﬀective and eﬃcient access control mechanism.
The road to achieve this is paved with the following chal-
lenges: (1) information transacted through EPCDS is con-
stantly increasing, while churn rates of users is highly dy-
namic. This dynamism makes access control policies highly
complex. (2) Each partner publishes information indepen-
dently to EPCDS applying a myriad of access control poli-
cies. This disparate collection of access control policies in
EPCDS makes it diﬃcult to process, manage and maintain
these policies eﬀectively. Adding to this complexity, part-
ners may not know of the existence of all participants in the
supply chain. These made traditional access control mecha-
nisms based on identity of users unsuitable. (3) As EPCDS
is introduced to increase the visibility of RFID- related ob-
jects [9], it is important to support visibility policies (e.g.
event information of an EPC is only allowed to be accessed
by these partners who have handled the product with this
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EPC). It is thus necessary to provide an eﬃcient approach
to specify and enforce these policies.
This paper presents the design and implementation of a
secure EPCDS system— SecDS. Our contributions are sum-
marized as follows:
• An extended attribute based access control (ABAC)
model is proposed for SecDS that enriches the expres-
siveness of access control policies, while supporting vis-
ibility policies.
• We design and implement SecDS where this extended
ABAC model is enforced without compromising on the
eﬃciency of users’ queries.
We begin with a description of background and motiva-
tions for our work in the following section. The extended
ABAC model is presented in Section 3 and the implementa-
tion of SecDS is introduced in Section 4. Section 5 summa-
rizes our experimental work and ﬁnally we introduce related
works, conclude the paper, and describe future works.
2. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
2.1 EPCglobal Network
As an important part of Internet of Things, EPCglobal
network is a global standard for RFID supply chain networks
providing a platform for trading partners to share product
information [7]. As a participant of the EPCglobal Network,
a company publishes event information of products into the
EPCglobal Network, to share with each other. These infor-
mation gives EPCglobal Network participants visibility of
the location and movement of objects within supply chains.
The architecture of EPCglobal Network is described in the
standard document [7], which is made up of many compo-
nents, such as EPC Discovery services (EPCDS), EPC In-
formation Services (EPCIS), and EPC Object Naming Ser-
vices (EPC ONS). While EPCDS provides query service for
serial-level information, EPC ONS provides search service
for class-level information [9].
The information in EPCDS is published by EPCISes and
searched by users. When a product with RFID tag passes
through a supply chain, event information is obtained by
RFID readers in each company and transmitted to its EP-
CIS. When an EPCIS captures event information about an
EPC for the ﬁrst time, it publishes this information into
the EPCDS. When a user searches for information about a
product with a given EPC, he ﬁrst issues a query to EPCDS
to get the addresses of EPCISes which handled the produc-
t with the given EPC. Next, the user queries each EPCIS
by using the addresses returned by EPCDS to ﬁnd the de-
tailed event information. These processes are based on the
Directory Look-up design [12], which SecDS complies to.
Based on the description above, we are aware that EPCDS
mainly stores information published from EPCISes. When
EPCDS uses relational databases as storage engine, the ta-
bles are illustrated in Table 1. In Table 1(a), the column
Time represents when the product (with EPC) is handled,
the column PubisherId represents the ID of the user who
published the entry, and the column CompanyId repre-
sents the company associated with the record. Tables 1(b)
and 1(c) store the information of users and companies. How-
ever, these tables only enumerate the basic attributes, while
other additional attributes used to provide precise query are
left out for clear presentations.
As shown in Table 1(a), EPCDS stores the information
of when, where and what products are handled by a com-
pany, which expose business information of companies. To
prevent unauthorized access of such sensitive information,
a suitable access control mechanism should be implemented
in the EPCDS, as highlighted in the corresponding standard
and related research work [7, 15].
In Example 2.1, we list many access control policies which
should be supported in EPCDS. This example will be used
throughout this paper.
Example 2.1. Suppose there exist two production Pro1
and Pro2 respectively with EPCs urn:epc:id:sgtin:4049588:-
083309.61157415873 1 and urn:epc:id:sgtin:4049588:083309.-
89605325977. For production Pro1, it comes from manufac-
turer M1 and is moved to distributor D2 and then shipped
to retailer R1. Similar to Pro1, production Pro2 is passed
through manufacturer M1, distributor D1, and retailers R1
and R2. All of these companies immediately published infor-
mation (shown in Table 1(a)) to EPCDS when they handle
these productions.
However, the information in Table 1(a) cannot be released
without any restriction. Diﬀerent companies deﬁne diﬀerent
access control policies to protect their information. In the
following, four representative policies are enumerated:
• pol1 (deﬁned by security administrator of manufacturer
M1): For the information about any product handled
after 2011-01-01, it is allowed to access by the users of
these companies who also handle this production and
are distributor companies.
• pol2 (deﬁned by security administrator of distributor
D1): For the information about any product whose
EPC likes urn:epc:id:sgtin:4049588:083310.* (these pro-
duction are valuable), it is only allowed to access by the
users of manufacturer M1, distributor D1, and retailer
R1 who are all partners.
• pol3 (deﬁned by security administrator of distributor
D1): For the information about the product whose EPC
doesn’t like urn:epc:id:sgtin:4049588:083310.*, it is al-
lowed to access by the users of these companies who
also handle this production.
• pol4 (deﬁned by security administrator of retail R1):
For the information about any product handled after
2011-03-01, it is allowed to access by the users of these
companies who handle this production before the time
R1 handles.
2.2 Visibility Policy
For two diﬀerent EPCISes a, b and an EPC e, the data
in EPCDS reﬂects two possible relationships between a and
b: they are both in the supply chain of e or they are not.
These relationships can be used to specify access control
policies. In Example 2.1, policies pol1, pol3 and pol4 all use
these relationships to specify access control policies, which
1The EPC number here is represented by a SGTIN notation
that is why the “urn:epc:id:sgtin” is used, and then comes
the company preﬁx(4049588), item reference(083309), and
serial number (61157415873)
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Table 1: Tables in EPCDS
(a) EPCDS-records
ID EPC Time PublisherId CompanyId
1 urn:epc:id:sgtin:4049588:083309.61157415873 2011-01-15 11:00 U1001 C101
2 urn:epc:id:sgtin:4049588:083309.89605325977 2011-01-20 14:30 U1001 C101
3 urn:epc:id:sgtin:4049588:083309.89605325977 2011-01-23 12:00 U1002 C102
4 urn:epc:id:sgtin:4049588:083309.61157415873 2011-02-01 10:00 U1003 C103
5 urn:epc:id:sgtin:4049588:083309.89605325977 2011-02-05 16:00 U1004 C104
6 urn:epc:id:sgtin:4049588:083309.61157415873 2011-02-10 15:30 U1004 C104
7 urn:epc:id:sgtin:4049588:083309.89605325977 2011-02-15 14:00 U1005 C105
(b) User-Companies
UserId Name CompanyId
U1001 Bob C101
U1002 Andy C102
U1003 John C103
U1004 Peter C104
U1005 Jack C105
(c) Companies
CompanyId Name Role URI
C101 M1 Manufacturer http://www.m1.com
C102 D1 Distributor http://www.d1.com
C103 D2 Distributor http://www.d2.com
C104 R1 Retailer http://www.r1.com
C105 R2 Retailer http://www.r2.com
are expressed as “who also handle this product”. Because
the access control policies speciﬁed by these relationships
directly aﬀect the visibility of the location and movement of
objects within supply chains, we call them visibility policy.
In [19], the authors also considered visibility policies, but
their work is related to supply chain, and cannot be used in
EPCDS. Following their work, we considered three kinds of
visibility policies: whole-stream policy, up-stream policy and
down-stream policy.
Definition 2.2. (whole-stream policy for EPC e de-
fined by company p) The event information published by
company p of EPC e, is allowed to access by users of any
companies who also publish event data of EPC e.
Definition 2.3. (up-stream policy for EPC e defined
by company p) The event information published by compa-
ny p of EPC e, is allowed to access by users of any companies
who also publish event data of EPC e before the time when
p publishes event data of EPC e.
Definition 2.4. (down-stream policy for EPC e de-
fined by company p) The event information published by
company p of EPC e, is allowed to access by users of any
companies who also publish event data of EPC e after the
time when p publishes event data of EPC e.
Based on the schema of Table 1(a), for a record of an
EPC e belonging to company c1 which is protected by the
whole stream policy, up-stream policy or down-stream poli-
cy, any user u2 belonging to company c2 is allowed to access
this record if the following corresponding SQL predicate is
satisﬁed:
• whole-stream policy:
exist (select * from EPCDS-records T where T.companyId
= c2 and T.EPC = e)
• up-stream policy:
exist (select * from EPCDS-record T where T.companyId
= c2 and T.EPC = e and T.Time < t)
• down-stream policy:
exist (select * from EPCDS-record T where T.companyId
= c2 and T.EPC = e and T.Time > t)
where t is the time when c handles the EPC e.
Due to the complexity of visibility policy, traditional ac-
cess control models (DAC, MAC, and RBAC) are not suit-
able for SecDS. In next section, we will extend attribute
based access control model to protect the information in
SecDS.
3. ATTRIBUTE-BASED ACCESS CONTROL
FOR SECDS SYSTEM
Diﬀerent from traditional access control models (DAC,
MAC and RBAC), attribute based access control (ABAC)
policies are deﬁned based on attributes of subjects and ob-
jects [30].
3.1 Attributes
In SecDS, subjects are users while objects are event infor-
mation in the table EPCDS records.
• Subject Attributes: A subject is a user, who takes ac-
tions on event information in SecDS. Each subject is
associated with a set of attributes which deﬁne the
identity and characteristics of the subject. Such at-
tributes may include the subject’s identiﬁer, name,
country and so on. As a subject represents a com-
pany in SecDS, the attributes of a company are also
considered as attributes of a subject belonging to it.
• Object Attributes: Objects are event information pub-
lished from EPCISes. Naturally, object attributes will
contain EPC, Time, and so on, which are the columns
of table EPCDS records.
• Visibility Attribute: To support visibility policy, we
set visibility attribute which takes one of the follow-
ing three values: whole-stream, up-stream and down-
stream.
3.2 ABAC Authorization Language
An authorization language (AUL) is used to deﬁne who is
allowed to perform what operations on what data. In this
paper, we only focus on query operations; therefore AUL
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does not contain operations. The ABAC authorization lan-
guage (AUL) is shown as follows:
AUL:=object condition ∧ subject condition
| object condition ∧ visibility condition
| object condition ∧ subject condition ∧ visibility condition
where subject condition, object condition and visibility cond-
ition are all boolean conditions for subject attributes, objec-
t attributes and visibility attributes respectively. All these
conditions are constructed by the rules shown in Figure 1.
condition := expression | condition op condition
| (condition op condition)
expression := attribute comp value |
attribute comp attribute |
attribute comp {value_set}
op := and | or
comp := < | > | =| <= | >= | [NOT] LIKE | [NOT] IN
value_set := value | value, value_set
Figure 1: Condition Language
Example 3.1. The access control policies described in Ex-
ample 2.1 are speciﬁed in Table 2 according to the authoriza-
tion language in Figure 1.
Expressiveness: The authorization language of SecDS
is semantically richer and more expressive. Firstly, as an
extension of ABAC, this AUL inherits the expressiveness
from ABAC which encompasses the functionality of iden-
tity based access control, such as DAC and MAC, and R-
BAC [30]. Secondly, while conforming to the standards of
EPCDS, this AUL supports visibility policies which are not
considered in other access control models.
4. SECDS SYSTEM
4.1 Architecture of SecDS System
Before introducing the implementation approach, we ﬁrst
provide the architecture of SecDS as shown in Figure 2.
EPCDS Data Policies
Policy 
Management
Query 
Modification
Users Policy Administrators
Policy 
Services
EPCDS
Figure 2: Architecture of SecDS system
SecDS contains the following components: Data Storage
Server, Policies Storage Server, Policy Management, Policy
Service, and Query Modiﬁcation. Data Storage Server stores
the event information published from EPCISes and some
auxiliary information, while Policies Storage Server stores
access control policies. Policy Management, Policy Service
and Query Modiﬁcation components are related to access
control. We will focus on these three components in the
following sections.
4.2 Policy Management
Policy Management Component (PMC) is used by
policy administrator to manage access control policies. There
are two diﬀerent types of policies in SecDS system. First is
global policy which is deﬁned by the security administrator
of SecDS. Second is local policy which is deﬁned by the se-
curity administrator of each EPCIS. The local policy is used
to control users’ query. Other types of accesses from users,
such as publishing data and querying data, are controlled
under global policy.
Query operation is the most important access in SecDS,
while access control policy over query operation is the most
complicated policy. In the following, we only consider lo-
cal policies which are deﬁned by security administrators of
diﬀerent EPCISes to protect their published data.
For managing local policies, PMC provides services for se-
curity administrator of each EPCIS to create, modify and
delete their access control policies. We take creation of ac-
cess control policies as an example to illustrate the process
in PMC.
Syntax 
Analysis
Semantic 
Analysis
ABAC Policy 
Transformation
Figure 3: Process of creating policy in policy man-
agement component
As shown in Figure 3, there are three steps for creating
policies in PMC: Syntax Analysis, Semantic Analysis, and
ABAC Policy Transformation. The Syntax Analysis and
Semantic Analysis make sure syntax and semantic of newly
created access control policies are correct, which are simi-
lar to the corresponding components in most access control
systems.
In order to reduce the cost of users’ queries, ABAC poli-
cies are transformed into ﬁne-grained access control (FGAC)
policies which use SQL predicates to express users’ privilege
[1, 22, 25, 5, 28, 27]. In FGAC policy, it assigns a predicate
to a user to express which data is allowed to access by the
user. FGAC policy is a special case of ABAC policy where
the attributes of object are the columns of relational tables
and the attribute of subject is user’s ID.
The transformation of an ABAC policy into FGAC poli-
cies can be taken in two steps. First, an ABAC policy is
divided into three diﬀerent predicates: subject predicate,
object predicate and visibility predicate, which contain sub-
ject attributes, object attributes, and visibility attributes,
respectively. Second, PMC ﬁnds all users in SecDS which
satisfy the subject predicate, and then assigns the object
predicate and visibility predicate to these users. The trans-
formation is similar to the technique given in [17]. In the
following, we take an example to further illustrate the ABAC
policy transformation.
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ID Name Predicate Creator CompanyId
1 pol1 Time > 2011-01-01 ∧ (Visibility = whole-stream ∧ Role = Distributor) C1001 C101
2 pol2 EPC LIKE urn:epc:id:sgtin:4049588:083310:* ∧ Name IN (M1, D1, R1) C1002 C102
3 pol3 EPC NOT LIKE urn:epc:id:sgtin:4049588:083310:* ∧ Visibility = whole-stream C1002 C102
4 pol4 Time > 2011-03-01 ∧ Visibility = up-stream C1004 C104
Table 2: ABAC policy table.
UserID ABACPolicy ObjectPredicate Visibility Creator CompanyId
U1002 pol1 TIME > 2011-01-01 whole-stream U1001 C101
U1003 pol1 TIME > 2011-01-01 whole-stream U1001 C101
U1001 pol2 EPC LIKE urn:epc:id:sgtin:4049588:083310:* NULL U1002 C102
U1002 pol2 EPC LIKE urn:epc:id:sgtin:4049588:083310:* NULL U1002 C102
U1004 pol2 EPC LIKE urn:epc:id:sgtin:4049588:083310:* NULL U1002 C102
0 pol3 EPC NOT LIKE urn:epc:id:sgtin:4049588:083310:* whole-stream U1002 C102
0 pol4 TIME > 2011-03-01 up-stream U1004 C104
Table 3: FGAC policy table.
Example 4.1. Consider the tables in Table 1 and the ABAC
policies in Example 3.1. Policy pol1 can be divided into the
following three parts:
• Subject Predicate: role = Distributor;
• Object Predicate: TIME > 2011-01-01;
• Visibility Predicate: visibility = whole-stream.
Then, by using subject predicate, we construct the following
SQL statement where the subject predicate is added in the
WHERE clause:
SELECT UseId FROM User-Companies UC, Companies C
WHERE UC.companyId = C.CompanyId and
Role = Distributor;
After executing the above SQL statement the results {U1002,
U1003} is returned. Then, the ﬁrst two records in Table 3
are constructed. All policies in Example 3.1 are transformed
into FGAC policies in the table 3. The users’ IDs are both
0 in the last two records in Table 3, which means these poli-
cies should be checked for all users’ queries. When there is
no subject predicate in an ABAC policy, the user ID in the
record stored the transformed FGAC policy is 0.
ABAC Policy Transformation has both advantages and
disadvantages. It improves the eﬃciency of users’ queries
but increases the complexity of policy management. While
supporting ﬂexible and highly expressive access control poli-
cies, attribute based access control takes more time to make
access decision. In ABAC system, it needs to determine
whether a user satisﬁes an ABAC policy. This will take
time if there are many ABAC policies and users as explained
clearly in [17]. After transforming ABAC policies into F-
GAC polices, the cost of determining where a user satisﬁes
an ABAC policy is relatively easy by checking the user’s
query against relevant FGAC policies. However, as stated in
[17], the work of maintaining the consistence between ABAC
policies and transformed FGAC policies is cumbersome s-
ince there are many situations to be taken into account such
as values of users’ attributes being changed, ABAC policies
being added, deleted or updated, and users being added,
deleted, or updated. We adapt the approaches proposed in
[17] to solve these problems. In a nut shell, we improve the
query performance at the cost of policy management.
4.3 Policy Service
The Policy Service Component (PSC) interacts the
Query Modification Component (QMC) in access con-
trol. There are two types of services in PSC: FGAC Policy
Searching Service (FPSS) and FGAC Policy Combining Ser-
vice (FPCS). When a user issues a query, QMC knows which
companies’ data is required to access by this query and then
sends the current user’s ID and these companies’ IDs to P-
SC. PSC ﬁrst calls FPSS to search in the FGAC policy table
for the FGAC policies that are assigned to this user and are
created by the companies with the given companies’ IDs.
Then, PSC invokes FPCS to combine the returned FGAC
policies into a single predicate before return it to QMC.
The implementation of FPSS is simple. First, when get-
ting the current user’s ID and many companies’ IDs, FPSS
constructs an SQL query to search in the FGAC policy ta-
ble for all FGAC policies which are assigned to this user and
created by these companies. Then FPSS sends these FGAC
policies to FPCS.
Upon receiving a set of FGAC policies from FPSS, FPCS
combines these policies into one single predicate. Before
introducing combination algorithm, we ﬁrst revisit visibility
policy.
In section 2.2, we already mentioned that what SQL predi-
cates are equal to whole-stream policy, up-stream policy and
down-stream policy. However, for understanding easily, in
those predicates we directly used the values of EPC and
time. These predicates cannot be used in our query modiﬁ-
cation algorithm. So, we further transform these predicates
into SQL predicates which can be directly used in query
modiﬁcation algorithm.
In the following SQL predicates, T1 represents the table
same to T , which are both table EPCDS records; u1 repre-
sents the current user’s ID who belongs to company c1.
• Whole-stream policy:
exist (select 1 from T1 where T1.companyId = c1 and
T.EPC = T1.EPC)
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• Up-stream policy:
exist (select 1 from T1 where T1.companyId = c1 and
T.EPC = T1.EPC and T1.Time < T.Time)
• Down-stream policy:
exist (select 1 from T1 where T1.companyId = c1 and
T.EPC = T1.EPC and T1.Time > T.Time)
There are three steps taken to combine any FGAC poli-
cies.
Step 1: Each FGAC policy is transformed into one pred-
icate:
• If an FGAC policy consists of a visibility predicate on-
ly, the visibility predicate is transformed into an EX-
IST SQL predicate as described above.
• If an FGAC policy consists of an object predicate as
described above, there is no need of any transforma-
tion.
• If an FGAC policy is made up of a visibility predicate
and an object predicate, the two predicates are com-
bined into one predicate in the following steps. First,
the visibility predicate is transformed into EXIST SQL
predicate; then the object predicate is moved into the
WHERE clause of the EXIST SQL predicate with con-
nector AND.
Step 2: A predicate is added for each FGAC policy to
ensure that this policy only protect the data of the company
which creates this policy without aﬀecting any other com-
panies’ data. The predicate is “companyId = CX”, which we
call own predicate, where CX is the ID of the company which
creates this policy. Let pd1 denote the predicate constructed
in step 1. If pd1 is an EXIST SQL predicate, the own pred-
icate is added to the WHERE clause of pd1 with connector
AND; if pd1 is just an object predicate, the own predicate is
combined directly with pd1 by using AND connector.
Step 3: Assume that after step 1 and step 2, two poli-
cies are transformed into predicates pd2 and pd3, respective-
ly. A connector OR is used to combine two FGAC policies
in three cases:
• When pd2 and pd3 are both EXIST SQL predicates
, the predicate belonging to WHERE clause of pd2 is
moved into the WHERE clause of pd3 with OR con-
nector.
• If one of predicates pd2 and pd3 is EXIST SQL pred-
icate (assuming pd2 is an EXIST SQL predicate, and
pd3 is a common predicate), pd3 is moved into the
WHERE clause of pd2 with connector OR.
• If pd2 and pd3 are both common predicates , pd2 and
pd3 are combined directly with connector OR.
The use of own predicate in step 2 and OR connector
in step 3 ensures that all ABAC policies created by one
EPCIS take no eﬀect on any other companies’ data. By
using OR to combine two FGAC policies, it is potential to
increase users’ privileges while creating new policies [1]. For
further restricting users’ privilege, a security administrator
can revise existing policies instead of writing a new one.
The detailed combination algorithm is shown in Algorithm
1. The complexity of this algorithm is O(N) where N is the
number of policies which are combined.
Algorithm 1 Policy combination algorithm
Input: poicySet : pSet;
Output: combinedpolicy : cp
1: cp = NULL
2: for i = 1 to pSet.Length do
3: tempply = pSet[i];
4: get object predicate objp from tempply
5: get visibility policy visp from tempply
6: get publisher ID pubId from tempply
7: combine objp and visp to form predicate pred
8: form an own predicate using pubId and add the
formed own predicate to pred with AND
9: combine predicates pred and cp with OR and then
give the combined predicate to cp
10: end for
11: return cp
Example 4.2. Consider the FGAC policies in Table 3.
Suppose the user with userId U1003 submits a query to search
for the information about EPC = urn:epc:id:sgtin:40495-
88:083309.89605325977 in Table 1(a). First, QMC gets the
set of companies’ IDs {C101, C102, C104, C105}, which
publish the EPC information , and sends the set to FPSS.
Then FPSS executes the following query to get FGAC poli-
cies:
SELECT * From FGAC_TABLE WHERE (UserID = U1003 or
UserId = 0) AND CompanyId IN (C101, C102,
C104, C105);
In Table 3, UserId = 0 means all users’ accesses should be
controlled by this policy. The results are the second, sixth
and seventh records in Table 3.
Then FPCS combines the three policies into one single
predicate. For the second records in Table 3, the object pred-
icate is TIME > 2011-01-01, and visibility is whole-stream.
The visibility policy is transformed into EXIST predicate as
follows:
EXIST (SELECT 1 FROM EPCDS_records T1 WHERE
T1.companyId = C103 and T.EPC = T1.EPC)
The object predicate and the own predicate companyId =
C101 are both added to the WHERE clause of the above
predicate with AND so as to form the predicate item 1 shown
below. The transformed predicates for the sixth and seventh
records in Table 3 are shown in the following items 2 and 3,
respectively. Finally, items 1, 2 and 3 are combined into the
following item 4 as the ﬁnal predicate.
1. pred1 = EXIST (SELECT * FROM EPCDS records
T1 WHERE (T1.CompanyId = C103 AND T.EPC =
T1.EPC AND T.TIME> 2011-01-01) AND T.Compa-
nyId = C101);
2. pred2 = EXIST (SELECT ∗ FROM EPCDS records
T1 WHERE (T1.CompanyId = C103 AND T.EPC =
T1.EPC AND T.EPC NOT LIKE urn:epc:id:sgtin:404-
9588:0083310:*) AND T.CompanyId = C102).
3. pred3 = EXIST (SELECT * FROM EPCDS records
T1 WHERE (T1.CompanyId = C103 AND T.EPC =
T1.EPC AND T1.TIME < T.TIME AND T.TIME >
2011-03-01) AND T.CompanyId = C104).
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Algorithm 2 Query Modiﬁcation Algorithm
Input: originalQuery : Q; userId;
Output: modifiedQuery : Q′
1: form a query to get the set comIdSet of company IDs
who have the data queried by Q;
2: send comIdSet and userId to PSC to get the combined
predicate pred
3: construct a view using pred and Table EPCDS records
4: replace Table EPCDS records with the view in Q to get
Q′
5: return Q′
4. pred4 = EXIST (SELECT * FROM EPCDS records
T1 WHERE ((T1.CompanyId = C103 AND T.EPC =
T1.EPC AND T.TIME > 2011-01-01) AND T.Pub-
lisher = C101) OR ((T1.CompanyId = C103 AND
T.EPC = T1.EPC AND T.EPC NOT LIKE urn:epc:-
id:sgtin:4049588:0083310:*) AND T.CompanyId = C-
102) OR (( T1.CompanyId = C103 AND T.EPC =
T1.EPC AND T1.TIME < T.TIME AND T.TIME >
2011-03-01) AND T.Company = C104)).
4.4 Query Modification
The basic idea of query modiﬁcation is that before being
processed, user queries are transparently modiﬁed to ensure
that users can access only what they are authorized to access
[28]. Query modiﬁcation is widely used in databases to en-
force ﬁne-grained access control which is also demonstrated
as a scalable and eﬃcient technique [22, 25, 28].
As aforementioned, ABAC policies in SecDS are trans-
formed into FGAC policies, so that we can use query modi-
ﬁcation technique to enforce FGAC policies in SecDS.
Algorithm 2 shows our query modiﬁcation algorithm. At
the beginning, the original query is modiﬁed using “Compa-
nyId” to replace the select target in the original query. The
modiﬁed query is executed to return all company IDs who
have the queried data. Then, the set of company IDs and
the current user ID are sent to Policy Service Component to
get a combined predicate. A temporary view is constructed
using the returned predicate and EPCDS records. Finally,
the view is used to replace table EPCDS records in the o-
riginal query to form the ﬁnial modiﬁed query which will be
executed instead of the original query.
Example 4.3. Suppose that user U1003 queries for the
information about EPC urn:epc:id:sgtin:4049588:083309.896-
05325977. The original query Q1 is constructed and mod-
iﬁed into Q2 to get all companies whose data is requested
to access. After sending the user’s ID and the set of com-
panies’ IDs to Policy Services Component, PSC returns the
combined predicate pred4 in Example 4.2. Finally, the re-
turned predicate pred4 is used to form a view which replaces
the table EPCDS records to form the ﬁnal modiﬁed query
Q3.
• Q1: SELECT * FROM EPCDS record WHERE EPC
= urn:epc:id:sgtin:4049588:083309.89605325977;
• Q2: SELECT companyId FROM EPCDS record WHERE
EPC = urn:epc:id:sgtin:4049588:083309.89605325977;
• Q3: SELECT * FROM (SELECT * FROM EPCD-
S record T WHERE pred4) WHERE EPC = urn:epc:id-
:sgtin:4049588:083309.89605325977.
Security: We assume that SecDS is a trusted server
where a secure authentication mechanism is implemented.
The query modiﬁcation algorithm determines the security
property of SecDS. In [28], a criterion with three properties
is proposed for enforcing ﬁne-grained access control policies
in databases; one of these properties is secure. The secure
property is deﬁned as having no information leaked to ad-
versaries under access control policy. It is also stated that
the algorithm in [22], which constructs temporary views to
replace the tables in user’s query, is secure, because the infor-
mation to which the user is not allowed to access, is ﬁltered
out in the constructed temporary views. As only row-level
policies are used, our query modiﬁcation algorithm is a spe-
cial case of the algorithm given in [22], which supports both
row-level and cell-level policies.
5. EXPERIMENTS
We implemented a prototype of SecDS system. Rigorous
experiments conducted on the prototype show that SecDS is
practical. The average query response time is about 260ms
in a setting of 50, 000 supply chains, 300 EPCISes, on aver-
age 20 EPCISes being involved in each supply chain and on
average 10 policies being evaluated for each query. Details
of our experiments are given in an extended version of this
paper.
6. RELATED WORK
EPCglobal network provides a platform for trading part-
ners to share their product information [10], where EPCIS
and EPCDS play an important role for increasing data visi-
bility [11, 9]. There are lots of work focusing on how to im-
plement EPCIS and EPCDS for providing traceability and
increasing visibility [2, 13, 14, 20, 24]. However, the infor-
mation in EPCIS and EPCDS is sensitive which should be
protected.
In [15], the authors proposed and implemented a ﬁne grained
access control mechanism to protect the information in EP-
CIS, where query modiﬁcation technique is used. However,
the access control policy for EPCIS is simpler than that of
EPCDS. This is because access control policies for an EP-
CIS are deﬁned by the administrator of this EPCIS only,
but the policies for EPCDS are deﬁned by diﬀerent security
administrators of diﬀerent companies. The access control
approach designed for EPCIS cannot be directly applied for
EPCDS.
Li el. at. proposed a semantic access control for RFID-
enabled supply chains. Since it is not conform to the EPC-
global network, it cannot be used for EPCDS [23].
In [29], Yan et. al. considered an diﬀerent situation where
the EPCDS is an untrusted server, and they proposed a
pseudonym-based design to mitigate the adversary’s attack.
Their work is also not conform to EPCglobal network and
is not practical in real world applications.
Rigorous eﬀort has been made in the research community
on the security and privacy aspects of RFID systems e.g. [6,
18, 16]. However, these work mainly target at RFID com-
munication systems, rather than EPC discovery services. To
the best of our knowledge, SecDS is the ﬁrst secure and ef-
ﬁcient EPC discovery service system with suitable access
control mechanism.
Since access control mechanism for EPCDS should sup-
port complex policies such as visibility policies, traditional
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access control models such as DAC, MAC, RBAC and TR-
BAC [4, 3, 26] may not suitable. Attribute based access
control (ABAC) [21, 30] is adapted in this paper to meet
the requirements of access control for EPCDS.
7. CONCLUSION
This paper described SecDS, a search engine based on
EPCDS for EPCGlobal network. SecDS is not only eﬃcient
in processing users’ search queries, but also secure and ex-
pressive in enforcing various data protection. We analyzed
the requirements of access control for EPCDS and proposed
an extended attribute based access control model to meet
the requirements. In order to maintain eﬃciency, we pro-
posed an approach of transforming ABAC policies to FGAC
policies, and using query modiﬁcation techniques to imple-
ment these FGAC policies. In future, we will consider how
to further enhance the performance of SecDS.
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